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CHAPTER ONE  
STUDIES OF REPETITION:  
ESTABLISHING A UNIT OF ANALYSIS  
 
 
 
A Review of studies of repetition 
Like most things under the sun, interest in repetitions dates back to 
antiquity. Ancient Rhetoric starts off with a severe chastisement of 
repetition as a flaw in written style: 
 
Thus strings of unconnected words, and constant repetitions of words and 
phrases, are very properly condemned in written speeches: but not in 
spoken speeches—speakers use them freely, for they have a dramatic 
effect. In this repetition there must be variety of tone, paving the way, as it 
were, to dramatic effect. (Aristotle) 
 
However, in Poetics Aristotle redeems the virtue of repetition as a figure 
of speech which purposefully strays from the every-day norm and gives 
essence to the elevated style–the most sophisticated among four language 
varieties. Following in his footsteps, Demetrius writes: 
 
The repetition of a word also conduces to elevation, as in the following 
passage of Herodotus: “There were huge serpents in the Caucasus, huge 
and many” (Vid. Herod. 1. 203). The reiteration of the word “huge” 
imparts certain impressiveness to the style. ( Demetrius) 
 
In modern day, a web search via the Google tool Scholar returns about 500 
000 hits on the subject of repetition. Most results, however, are cognitive 
studies of the effect of repetition on memory and very few relate to style or 
poetics, as was the custom in antiquity. Indeed, on Scopus, one of the 
largest abstract and citation databases of research literature, “repetition” is 
keyword for more than 5 000 articles in the subject areas of neuroscience 
and psychology but only 1500–in the area of social sciences, which is the 
overarching rubric for rhetoric. Even there most of the articles dwell on 
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the link between repetitions and the functioning of the brain and not on 
how repetitions shape style. 
 
Advice on using repetitions in writing and speech is particularly confusing. 
It varies from “Never ever” to “Avoid substituting one word for another 
only for the sake of variety”. As prescription is rightfully out of fashion 
nowadays, we can expect some descriptive studies on the issue. However, 
none seems to exist. The closest that gets to such a study is the observation 
in Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) that in written texts repetitions would 
have been weeded out in the editing process, while the nature of the 
spoken language requires more frequent reminding of what is being talked 
about, and editing is impossible, so repetitions would be more frequent. 
No evidence is provided in favour of these observations and they are all 
too brief, so we cannot take them too seriously.  
 
Discourse studies, as the branch in linguistics which research repetitions, 
shift the attention to repeating various units as a mechanism which makes 
a text “hang together”. Two types of cohesive instruments are described–
grammatical and lexical. The grammatical connectors accomplish some 
sort of substitution based on parameters proceeding from the respective 
language system–pronominal substitution, various deictics, the use of the 
definite article to point to a previous occurrence, overt comparisons, etc. 
However, they are not of interest to this study. Lexical links, which are in 
the focus here, are explained by Halliday and Hasan (1976) with language 
bonds such as synonymy, antonymy, or various semantic relations, like: 
the concept of “ordered sets” which connects ordinal numbers; the notion 
of “colour” which links adjectives like white, black, red etc.; relations of 
hyponymy, which unite mouth and face etc.  
 
If one is to seek such relations in texts, however, serious obstacles occur. 
One impediment is polysemy. For instance, the sentences below both 
contain the verb “shoot”, but in different meanings. Clearly, they are not 
connected into a cohesive text, despite the existence of this purportedly 
lexical link: 
 
At least one protester has been shot dead and three wounded as thousands 
of Afghans demonstrated against plans by a radical US pastor to burn 
Korans on the anniversary of 9/11. 
Fifa chief is considering introducing the shoot-out after 90 minutes. 
(The Times September 10th, 2010 front page) 
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A further complication to establishing lexical links is that there does not 
seem to exist a comprehensive list of lexical relations which perform text-
formative functions. As in the definition above, an open enumeration is 
introduced, completed with etcetera. Researchers are thus left to their 
intuition to construe lexical relations obtaining between seemingly 
cohesive items in texts, while keeping in mind that some may be 
accidental. Clearly, such an approach is not conducive to rigorous 
analysis.  
 
A different type of lexical mechanism for cohesion is proposed by 
Viehweger (1976). It is called “a nominative list” and is supposed to 
include all the lexis connected with a certain topic in a text, e.g. snow, 
cold, winter. The problem, of course, is whether we can include scarf and 
sleigh and what the respective text would look like:  
 
1. It became cold and snow started to fall.  
2. Jack put on his coat and scraf and went to fetch his sleigh. 
3. Models paraded wearing scarves and sleighs. 
 
Somehow 1 is more likely to be developed into a text by 2, rather than 3, 
although both contain the same parts of the prospective nominative list.  
Apart from the indiscriminate inclusiveness, such an approach to 
nominative lists poses the question: is it the case that the lexis is related 
inherently, or does the occurrence in a text make words cohere? 
 
A more sophisticated approach is suggested by Morris and Hirst 
(1991:29), who employ the index of the thesaurus dictionary, which is 
based on a semantic classification. The index includes a number of general 
categories, such as “space”, “matter”, “intellect”, subdivided into smaller 
categories, e.g. “matter” splits into “organic” and “inorganic”. Each category 
gets a number, indexed also for the respective subcategories. Morris and 
Hirst propose 5 cases of linkage: 
 
• Two words have a category common in their index  entries, e.g. 
residentialness and apartment both have category 189: “presence”;  
• One word has a category in its index entry that contains a pointer 
to a category in the other word, e.g car has category 273 that 
contains a pointer to 276, which is a category of the word driving;  
• A word is either a label in the other word’s entry, or is in a 
category of the other word, e.g. blind has category 442, which 
contains the word see;   
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• Two words are in the same group and hence are semantically 
related, e.g. blind–blindness; see–vision; 
• The two words have categories in their index entries that both 
point to a common category, e.g. brutal has index 851, terrified 
has index 860, and both have a pointer to 830.   
 
The authors have obviously invested a lot of labour perusing the Thesaurus 
and this, indeed, appears a rigorous and principled classification. Even if 
other researchers are prepared to repeat the feat, however, they will not 
come up with the same results. Morris and Hirst used Roget’s Thesaurus 
of 1977 and the edition of 1987 already has a different arrangement of the 
categories, therefore, different types of links will evolve from there.  
 
The most straight-forward classification of cohesive lexical ties is proposed 
by Hoey (1991). It is based on two criteria–belonging to the lexical 
paradigm of a word, called “simple lexical repetition”, or derived from the 
same root, dubbed “complex lexical repetition”: 
 
• Simple lexical repetition–the lexical item is repeated through 
forms of its grammatical paradigm, e.g. bear–bears. (p.52) 
  
• Complex lexical repetition–the item and its repetition are derivatives 
but belong to different morphological classes, e.g. drug (n)–
drugging (adj.)(p.55) 
 
A third category presents what Hoey calls “paraphrases”. They result from 
applying more than one type of lexical link simultaneously, for instance, 
writer and writings present a case of complex lexical repetition, on the one 
hand; writer  and author are  synonyms, on the other, and the two links 
lead to a third one—between author and writings. This is the so-called 
“triangle” (p.65) which bridges across different types of lexical relations. 
Such links may exist even when not all of their components are to be 
found in the text.  However, despite falling within the category of lexical 
ties, some repetitions are called “chance” (p.56) because they do not 
perform linking functions. Thus a shadow is cast over the claim that 
lexical relations create links in texts. 
 
All these studies are thorough and plausible, but any student of cohesive 
lexis will be rightfully confused by the complex procedures, the fuzzy 
principles and above all–by the direction of the search for cohesive lexis: 
is it the case that lexis has the power to link because of some inherent 
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(probably semantic) properties, or does the fact that it belongs to a topic 
introduced in the text make it so?     
 
Another serious problem with studies of lexical ties is the inseparable 
relation between lexical links and co-reference. Having dubbed lexical 
cohesion “semantic”, Halliday and Hasan (1976) classify it into expressions 
with identical, inclusive, exclusive or unrelated reference. While reference 
is defined as a grammatical tie, lexical links are supposed to be semantic in 
nature–therefore, substantiating a completely different type of link. 
However, most researchers end up looking for lexical relations among co-
referring expressions in the text, as if no ties can exist without the process 
of co-reference. Now, if a relation of a specifically lexical character is 
sought, it should be divorced from the issue of reference. Otherwise 
textual connections of purely lexical essence can not be claimed to exist.     
 
In a later work (1985), Halliday and Hasan adopt a classification based on 
the components in the naming process which will be described in detail 
later in this chapter. Ties which obtain between the extensions–the objects 
in reality named by the nouns–are known as “co-extension”; ties which are 
due to belonging to the same (morphological) class are known as “co-
classification” (p.74); links which connect all the words used to refer to 
the same referent are known as “co-reference”. In effect, co-extensions 
turn out to be synonyms, antonyms etc., co-classifications are substitutes, 
such as “so did he”, “I am one” etc.; and co-reference is precisely the 
mechanism naming the same referent by nouns, pronouns and other 
expressions. Thus what the authors call “semantic principles” for lexical 
cohesion is entirely subsumed into the category of grammatical links, 
except for the co-extensions, which are again left as an unfinished list of 
presumably semantic relations. However, basing a classification of lexical 
links on the specifics of the naming process seems like a well-grounded 
approach and we shall adopt it for the study of lexical links.  More about 
that will be revealed in the next part of this chapter. 
 
A good point of departure for a study of repetitions is to ask the question: 
what is repeated? From the brief review of lexical cohesion above we saw 
that in some cases the reference to an object is repeated, in others – 
isolated semantic components, yet others reiterate merely the linguistic 
form. Needless to say, these are all repetitions of completely different 
types and should be treated in accordance with their nature. Furthermore, 
the unit of analysis differs in the literature on repetitions. While 
Demetrius’s example quoted above discusses a single word—huge, 
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Aristotle points to the recurrence of syntactic structures which create 
parallels. Likewise, when writing about “repetition”, various branches of 
modern Linguistics seem to refer to different units. Variation analysis, to 
begin with, looks at recurring structures which characterise the degree of 
formality (Schiffrin 1994:293). Speech act analysis, for its part, 
distinguishes between repeating the turns of each communicant or between 
the two communicants (Labov 1972:366). Genre analysis, for its part, 
concludes that advertisements repeat noun phrases to give prominence to 
the respective brand names, while product manuals repeat to ensure 
against mistaken identity (Cook 1994:32). These brief examples serve to 
show how different the units of repeating can be–from a conversational 
turn, through a noun phrase to a grammatical structure.  
 
Therefore, a comprehensive study of repetitions should start with positing 
a unit of analysis which is:  
 
• Undeniably lexical 
• Reflects the process of naming 
• Can be easily traced throughout the texts 
 
To find such a unit of analysis, we explore the process of naming.  
How lexical expressions refer to objects in reality 
The process of naming involves linking three components–a lexical item 
(a word or phrase), an object in reality (a thing) and the concept of it. The 
sides in this process are traditionally represented as a triangle (Lyons 
1968:404). However, for reasons which will become obvious later, we 
adopt a three-dimensional representation—the pyramid developed by 
Petofi (1985:89). It differs from the triangle in suggesting that the 
repetition might be of another form of the same word—the plural, or 
possessive, for instance. The semiotic pyramid, therefore, consists of a 
lexicon item, a form, a concept/ intension and a referent / extension (fig. 
1). The lexicon item is a part of the vocabulary of a language; the form is a 
realisation of the item in speech bearing morphological and syntactic 
marking in accordance with the language system and the intentions of the 
language user. The concept or intension is a mental category which 
includes the every-day and specialised knowledge about the object. More 
complicated from the philosophical point of view is the apex “extension”, 
or referent. Some notions, such as music, love, trust, etc. do not seem to 
single out any material object in reality, like the word “chair” would, for 
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example. Even more obvious is the case with verbs or adjectives, which 
rarely point to anything as concrete as the reference of nouns. Such terms 
will be considered non-referential here. They do not point to “things” in 
the world, but to concepts only.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Semiotoic pyramid proposed by Petofi 
 
The philosophy of language discusses issues of relating language to reality 
through the concept “description”. It is defined as a language expression 
capable of evoking only one entity in the real world which satisfies some 
truth condition, e.g.  
 
The King of France is bald 
 
All expressions which name a king of France–if such a character existed-
who is at the same time bald are truthful definite descriptions. (Russel 
1905). While Russel’s emphasis is more on the mathematical/ logical 
verification of the truth condition, Vendler (1967:36) sets out to establish 
which linguistic expressions perform the function of evoking one single 
referent. He calls such expressions “singular terms” and proposes that they 
evolve in a graded process. At the first stage an indefinite phrase is used 
relating the expression to a class and singling out one of its 
representatives. Secondly, co-reference to that representative is ensured by 
a second occurrence of the phrase with the definite article, thus confirming 
the identity of the referent. The process is schematically represented as 
follows:  
  
There exists a N  which .. 
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The primary introduction cannot include a generic phrase of the type:  
 
A cat is an animal... 
 
On the next stage of creating a singular term the definite article takes 
centre stage. The definite article is a function of a subordinate clause with 
a restrictive meaning. It shows that the scope of the noun thus restricted 
covers exhaustively all and every object within that scope. If the restriction 
covers a single representative, then the definite article is obligatory and it 
marks a singular term. In the other cases the term is generic and the 
definite article is not compulsory. 
 
The fact that common nouns can name any of a class of objects is taken 
for granted in linguistic philosophy. It is the case that man can name all 
the individuals on the planet of male sex. Unlike a proper name, which 
normally refers to the individual it was given to at birth, a common noun 
can name a whole class, unless a definite description restricts the reference 
to one single object, e.g. the man who came first in the competition. 
Chesterman (1991:69-74) defines the referential set of a lexeme (U) as 
including two parts: objects or events which have been explicated in the 
concrete speech situation (r) and objects and events which are not part of 
the concrete situation, although they satisfy the reference of the noun (r1). 
Each specific situation presents a different configuration of the set. 
 
U= r+ r1 
 
Set r1 is empty in cases of total reference (including all the members of the 
set) and U is equivalent to r. It is not empty in case of reference r1 which is 
not total and U, therefore, is not equal to r.  
 
This interpretation of reference can be extremely useful in cases such as 
these:  
 
A boy climbed up the tree. 
What is to be expected of a boy? 
 
The intensions of the emphasised noun phrases are identical, the naming 
complexes coincide but the first phrase relates to r–a referent in a concrete 
situation. The second phrase, for its part, relates to r1, because the 
referential set is not realised with the generic name. This is going to be a 
specific distinction in our treatment of repetitions–a phrase can be repeated 
with the referential set presented differently.  
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Another significant development in the philosophy of descriptions is the 
idea that some expressions are used to refer – to pick up a specific 
individual, while others focus on the description itself. To better 
understand the issue, take the famous example from Donnelan (1966):  
 
X wants to marry a girl his parents disapprove of.  
 
When used referentially, a specific girl is named with the phrase “a girl his 
parents disapprove of” and it stands for the name given to this girl. 
Attributively, however, the expression does not single out one referent, but 
any girl X’s parents disapprove of, i.e. specifies the characteristics of the 
desired candidate. Donnelan calls the two functions of noun phrases 
respectively “referential” and “attributive”. In terms of our discussion 
here, we can say that the first type of use emphasises the extension, while 
the second–the intension. Therefore, the repetition does not evoke the 
same entity, but recalls a broader intensional content.  
 
It is also customary in grammar to speak of “specified uses”, where a 
representative of a class is envisaged, and “identifying uses”, where a 
concrete person is referred to. Example 1 shows a specified use, while 2 – 
an identifying one:  
 
1. I want a rich husband. 
2. That is a man I met in the library yesterday. 
 
A popular approach to unraveling meaning, following Frege, is to take as 
the fundamental unit of analysis the whole sentence. This is justified in 
view of the fact that the reference of a term is derivative from the entire 
proposition. Thus, phrases which can relate to objects in reality may 
happen to be used to refer to an empty set, that is – non-referentially. Allan 
(1986:144) describes four types of non-referential phrases in English: 
 
• Phrases whose head falls within the scope of negation which 
presupposes or states that the denotation does not exist:  
 
God does not exist.  
There are no eggs left. 
 
• Phrases whose denotation comes into existence with the respective 
predication or is expected to turn up later:  
Chapter One  
 
10 
You make the toast and I`ll make the tea 
You must write a letter to your parents. 
 
• Phrases where the denotation may or may not exist – the speaker 
does not know with certainty: 
 
Are there any eggs left?  
Should there be some eggs left, we could have bacon and eggs. 
 
• Phrases whose denotation is an unspecified subset unknown to 
the speaker:  
 
Any dog will get upset if you kick it. 
 
Later on in time Green (1989:40) summarises contexts which can create 
non-referential naming phrases. They include: 
  
• conditional sentences 
• modal verbs 
• terms which create new worlds   
• adverbial clauses   
 
The final touch in describing links between words and reality comes with 
pragmatics, which deals with the intentions of the speakers. Pragmatics 
stresses the fact that the speaker has the right to select their reference 
within a freer range of options than the intension of a term gives. Nunberg 
(1978:6) introduces the notion of “pragmatic shifts” of the reference of a 
phrase. While a ham sandwich is a type of food, a waiter may use the 
linguistic expression to name a person who ordered such a sandwich:  
 
The ham sandwich wants his bill. 
 
Likewise, when we say “I drank a whole bottle”, we normally do not mean 
the glass, but the contents of that bottle, be it water, wine or cough 
medicine. The term “pragmatic shift of the intension” is, therefore, used 
for meaning relations, such as:” the content of ….”, “the reason for…”, 
“the publisher of …”, “one type of ….”, rather than the object itself.  In 
effect, Nunberg claims that nothing limits the range and complexity of the 
functions performed in the course of the naming process, once the 
intentions of the speaker are taken into consideration.  
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Apart from pragmatic, intensional shifts can also be metaphoric. Several 
examples show that people can be referred to as “swines” or “lions”, 
depending on which properties in the intension of the respective nouns are 
meant. In effect, the pragmatic component of naming takes us to Kripke’s 
(1980) position that reference is causative, i.e. the speaker decides what 
characteristics to impart with their utterance. According to Reimer (2005), 
this approach is typical for linguistic descriptions of reference. 
 
Finally, each object or event can be identified in one of two dimensions: 
the generic space, or the spacio-temporal (Thrane 1980:39). That is to say 
that the statement “A tiger attacked the cheetah” picks up two animals 
situated in the temporal dimension at a particular time and space. 
Contrarily, “A tiger would attack his victim” identifies one specimen of the 
genus in a non-specified situation, that is, generically. Another projection 
into the generic space would portray several animals as a group “Tigers 
live in forests”, while yet another realisation in the same non-specified 
space would point to a typical representative of the set: “The tiger is a 
carnivore”. Therefore, apart from using a phrase to refer, or to describe, 
the user can place their reference in a different dimension. 
 
From the point of philosophy, involving various “worlds of existence” in 
the analysis of expressions belongs to the domain of modal logic, which 
differs significantly from the logic presented by the positivists quoted 
above–Donnelan, Frege etc. However, for linguistics reference in different 
worlds is necessary in view of the fact that literature often refers to parallel 
existences, other worlds etc.  Furthermore, positivists would have to treat 
on a par the expressions “a unicorn” and “Santa Clause”, whose referents 
do not exist in our world, with the referents of  “There are no eggs” and 
“Prince Charming might exist”, whose existence is denied or doubted. We 
claim that the uses of these–and other non-referential phrases differs and 
should be treated differently, which is why the concept of worlds will be 
allowed here, together with the concept of descriptions within various 
predications.   
Conclusions 
In conclusion, our review of the literature on repetitions revealed that the 
interest in repetitions as a feature of style is waning in recent years. We 
find this unreasonable because people do need to write and know whether 
to avoid repetitions, or employ them in specific ways. Further, the 
approaches to repetitions in linguistic disciplines are characterised by 
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confusion with co-referring terms, a lack of a unified unit of analysis and a 
fuzzy position on the issue whether lexical items link because they are 
semantically related, or whether a joint occurrence in a text causes them to 
be related in some way. Therefore, we set out on a search for a unit of 
analysing repetitions which would be undeniably lexical, easy to trace and 
proceeding from the way words refer. 
 
In view of our criteria, the word form is perfect to perform the function of 
the unit of our analysis. We will trace whether the form, the intension and 
the extension change with repeated forms of a lexicon item. Because some 
notions are named by more than one word and the expressions may or may 
not be a fixed item in the nomenclature of a language, in lieu of “lexicon 
item”, we will use the term “a naming complex”. 
 
The form can change within the grammatical paradigm of the repeated 
item–to show plural, singular or possessive; as the article is a separate 
word in English, we will also need to keep track of definiteness. When it 
comes to the extension, the speaker is allowed to pick up a specific 
representative of the set (an identified use), or to spell out its 
characteristics (a specified representative); to avoid naming a referent 
through a generic name, or to evoke an iterative representative; to classify 
through predicative uses, or to evoke a zero representative through 
negation. When repeated forms of words present the referent in one of 
these ways, we shall say that they have different referentiality, or reflect 
the referential set in a different manner. Additionally, the repeated items 
can pick up a different representative of the class and then we shall say 
that they have different referents, although they may be members of the 
same class. The research model also allows for establishing shifts in the 
intension–pragmatic or metaphorical.   
 
In order to establish the role of repetitions as a text building mechanism, 
answers to the following five questions are sought:  
 
1. How significant is the repetition of word forms in three different 
genres?  
2. Is it the case that repeating word forms creates text structures?  
3. What is the role of each side of the naming process: the referent, the 
thought and the form?  
4. Does the nature of repetition change with each genre?  
 
Three hypotheses are tested:   
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• The major role of repetitions is to recall the same object. If this is 
true, each recurring word form will evoke the same referent in 
reality.  
• The main function of repetitions is to build conceptual links 
among the objects named. If that happens to be the case, the 
repetitions will evoke the same conceptual load while naming 
different objects, or remaining non-referential.   
• The major role of repetitions is literary–to build figures of 
speech. In that case, the respective figures will be obvious when 
tracing the repetitions.  
Corpora and method 
The study was initially carried out using a software package called “The 
Linguist’s Workbench” (Stambolieva 1996). Later, some of the analyses 
were repeated on the Wordsmith (Scot 1989), which provides richer 
statistical data and longer concordance lines. 
 
The texts for the corpora are: 
 
• Short stories written by established writers in English –61 125 
running words in 9 stories. 
• Research articles written by established researchers in English–
77 583 running words in 8 articles. 
• Political speeches in English delivered by outstanding 
personalities–26 897 in 10 speeches. 
 
Because the research needs complete texts, each one was run through the 
software independently of the others. To make the results from materials 
of different size compatible, a normalisation procedure was adapted from 
the one proposed by Biber (2000:263). The overall number of words is 
juxtaposed against the number of repetitions and a proportion per one 
million is calculated, using the formula: 
 
number of repetitions/number of word forms X 1000 
 
The result is called “index of repetitions” and is calculated for each text 
from each genre. The juxtaposition among the genres will reveal genre 
specifics; the juxtaposition among authors would show whether repetition 
is a matter of personal preference.  
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For comparative purposes, texts written by inexperienced writers are also 
included in the study. We proceed from the assumption that the parameters 
of the texts by established authors would reveal the essence of good 
writing; the features of the writing by inexperienced writers, for their part, 
would highlight differences, which would probably worsen the style as a 
whole.  
  
CHAPTER TWO  
REPETITIONS IN RESEARCH ARTICLES 
 
 
 
In this chapter I establish the repetitions in an article written by an 
experienced researcher and try to elicit patterns: do the repetitions occur in 
phrases with the same type of reference; is the same concept evoked with 
each repetition; are there intensional shifts in the repeated items? 
Secondly, I check whether the established types of repetition chains can be 
found in other specimens of the same genre, the research article. Thirdly, I 
demonstrate common features of the repetition chains and answer the 
question how each type of repetition chain helps the author reveal his idea. 
Next, I show what type of repetition chains occur in the writing of 
inexperienced authors, students, and how the specifics of the repetitions 
lead to building a clear or deficient style. This serves as a demonstration 
how repetitions can be employed as objective indicators of good and bad 
writing. Finally, a way to summarise a research article is shown using my 
classification of repetition chains.   
Part one: The repetitions in an article.  
Do they reveal a pattern? 
When all the words from a text are arranged according to their frequency, 
we get the so-called “frequency list” (Baker et al. 2006). The job of counting 
and arranging is performed by special software products – in this case – 
the Word Smith Tools (Scot 1989). Below is the frequency list from 
Chomsky’s article ‘Linguistic Contributions to the Study of Mind’ 
published on his website. The figure to the right presents the number of 
occurrences in this specific text. The first 90 positions are presented here 
as an illustration of the type of list acquired by these techniques, but the 
list is as long as the overall length of the article: 
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THE  881 
OF  811 
TO  439 
THAT  414 
IN  336 
A  314 
AND  300 
IS  294 
IT  173 
FOR  149 
LANGUAGE 149 
THIS  136 
AS  135 
BE  128 
ARE  107 
WE  90 
HUMAN  80 
NOT  78 
WITH  76 
HAS  75 
ON  73 
WHICH  72 
BY  70 
AN  68 
BUT  66 
I  66 
GRAMMAR 64 
THERE  64 
CAN  61 
HAVE  58 
ONE  57 
FROM  56 
OR  55 
STUDY  53 
STRUCTURE 52 
BEEN  51 
INNATE  48 
NO  45 
THESE  45 
HE  43 
HIS  43 
PROBLEM 43 
THEORY  43 
AT  41 
KNOWLEDGE 39 
SUCH  39
 
 
As can be seen, the most frequent words are function words and words of 
broader meaning, as predicted by Zipf (1949).  Because our interest here is 
in notional words–adjectives, nouns, verbs, adverbs and numerals, we first 
remove the function words–prepositions, articles, demonstratives, pro-
forms, auxiliary verbs etc. Having removed those, the list becomes more 
manageable and these are the top entries: 
 
LANGUAGE 149 
HUMAN  80 
GRAMMAR 64 
STUDY  53 
STRUCTURE 52 
INNATE  48 
PROBLEM 43 
THEORY  43 
KNOWLEDGE 39 
MIND  36 
SYSTEMS 35 
SYSTEM  34 
FACT  33 
LEARNING 33 
LANGUAGES 32 
POSSIBLE 32 
UNIVERSAL 32 
GENERAL 30 
PROPERTIES 30 
SEEMS  30 
DATA  28 
PRINCIPLES 28 
EXAMPLE 27 
ACQUISITION 26 
ANIMAL  24 
CONDITIONS 24 
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FIRST  24 
GENERATIVE 24 
LINGUISTIC 24 
ORGANISATION 24 
SENSE  24 
CASE  23 
PSYCHOLOGY 23 
SPECIFIC 23 
STRUCTURES 23
 
 
As has been noted by researchers (Scott and Tribble 2006, among numerous 
others), the most frequent items reveal the ‘about-ness’ of a text. In this 
case, the text is obviously about language, grammar, structures and the 
human mind. However, this is only an initial impression. If we look closer, 
the words can be sorted out into various groups.   
Repetitions of language 
The most frequent notional word language occurs more often than not in 
combination with the adjectives human and natural, and also in the phrase 
the study of language. The reference of the respective phrases tends to be 
generic, except for the latter phrase.  
 
The notions evoked with the naming complexes include a number of 
interpretations of the concept: 
 
1. Anyone concerned with the study of human nature and human capacities 
must somehow come to grips with the fact that all normal humans acquire 
language... 
2. ... these studies simply bring out even more clearly the extent to which 
human language appears to be a unique phenomenon 
3. In fact, it is difficult to see what links these stages at all (except for the 
metaphorical use of the term "language") 
4. ...the group which ought to have been able to evolve language in the true 
sense, and not the mammals 
5. Language is purposive "in that there is nearly always in human speech a 
definite intention of getting something over to somebody else… 
6. It seems clear that we must regard linguistic competence — knowledge of a 
language — as an abstract system underlying behaviour… 
7. Such a grammar defines a language in the Humboldtian sense, namely as 
"a recursively generated system ... 
 
In the first example the author uses the meaning “power or faculty of 
speech”, listed in position 4 in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). In 
the second one the meaning is “the vocal sounds by which mammals and 
birds communicate”, listed in the first position in OED. The third example 
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gives the citation form, which can pick up any of the meanings. Fourthly, 
language is presented as “the method of human communication, either 
spoken or written, consisting of the use of words in a structured and 
conventional way” (OED). In the fifth case the meaning “language (or a 
language) viewed as an abstract system, accepted universally within a 
speech community, in contrast to the actual linguistic behaviour or 
performance of individuals” is exploited. The sixth example envisages the 
most common meaning associated with the word: “the system of spoken or 
written communication used by a particular country, people, community, 
etc., typically consisting of words used within a regular grammatical and 
syntactic structure”. Finally, a concept introduced by Humboldt is brought 
into the scene. The distinctions may appear minute, but they are clearly 
distinguishable – both according to the dictionary and in the respective 
uses in the text.  
 
This pattern of occurrence indicates that the author deals with a number of 
concepts–other researcher’s and his own–of the notion named with the 
word language. In terms of this study, we can say that the form is 
associated with a different part of the intension of the lexeme for each 
occurrence, while few actual referents are evoked. We can conclude that 
the repetition serves the purpose of discussing various understandings of 
the concept, as well as a range of aspects of the respective phenomenon. 
The shift in the conceptual content enriches the discussion and adds a 
range of viewpoints. 
 
Another type of repetition presents the repeated word prefaced by various 
prepositional phrases: 
 
knowledge of a language, 
the structure of a language 
the study of language 
 
In this way, the concept is picked up for reference in one of its specific 
aspects, rather than as a whole. I shall call this type of referring 
“restructuring”, because the developed formal shape introduces a referent 
with a slightly changed identity. Therefore, the repetition does not stay 
steeped in the same unchanging intensional content but is enriched, thus 
pushing the presentation to further depth. An interesting feature of this 
type of reference is the co-existence of generic-ness and specific-ness. 
While knowledge of a language makes generic reference to knowledge of 
a specific language, the structure of a language calls a specific structure of 
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a language in its general sense. Thus we see a specific notion within a 
generic concept or a generic notion overarching a specific object.  
Repetitions of human 
A second type of notional word repeated frequently is human. Unlike 
language, this is an adjective and occurs in noun phrases with language, 
intelligence, thought, psychology, freedom and others. Its function is to 
relate the respective concepts to the sphere of human faculties and 
features. While the repetitions of language broaden the conceptual field 
with new aspects and modifications, the adjective human helps restrict the 
reference to a specific sphere. 
Repetitions of grammar 
The third highly frequent word is the noun grammar, which collocates 
with innate, generative, transformational, and philosophical. While the 
first noun we discussed was mainly included in generic phrases, this one 
occurs in quite a few specific phrases of a type which is illustrated with the 
following examples: 
 
a set of data for this grammar to be confirmed 
that the grammar contains a phrase structure component 
 
The uses of grammar above can be characterised as substituting previously 
used phrases abbreviated in their second occurrence. This differs from 
other specific uses in the fact that the way the phrase projects its 
denotation includes a previous mention of an entire phrase. Such reference 
is useful in cases when qualifications are made of a previously mentioned 
object. I am going to speak of this referential type as a substitute.  
 
Yet another type of phrases in which grammar is included is a number of 
generic phrases, illustrated with the following examples: 
 
now available suggests that if universal grammar has serious defects as indeed it 
it is reasonable to suppose that a generative grammar is a system of many  
the grammar of a language must be discovered by the child 
 
The examples show three types of generic nouns: with the zero article, 
with the definite one and with the indefinite article, each-with the 
respective characteristics. All of them present the referential set 
differently: with no specific representative–in the first case, with a random 
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representative–in the second, and with a typical one–for the definite 
phrase.  
 
The repetition is included as a substitute in the following case: 
 
that enables it to construct such a grammar from the data of sense 
 
Identifying phrases contain repetitions of grammar in the following 
examples: 
 
determining whether given data are compatible with a grammar of the given form 
a schema to which any particular grammar must conform 
what relation must hold between a potential grammar and a set of data 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that the repetitions of the noun do not change 
the intension of the noun, but present different referential types. As is 
known, generic nouns are instrumental in making generalisations, specific 
uses tend to exemplify issues or distinguish sub-types, the type we called 
“a substitute” bestows qualifications. That is why the variety of referential 
types includes the concept in the respective propositional functions. These 
functions make the repetitions of grammar quite different from the 
repetitions of language, which, as was pointed out above, broadens the 
scope of the objects under review in the article. The repetitions of 
grammar include it in various argumentative functions and thus place it in 
the centre of developing the author’s thesis. 
Repetitions of study 
So far we have seen recurring forms of an adjective and two types of 
repetitions of nouns, one of which changes the intension with each 
occurrence, the other recurs in varying referential types. The repetitions of 
the word study, for their part, are characterised by frequent reference to the 
concept the study of language; an even longer string is established–
contribution to the study of language. The reference varies–generic, 
specific, substitutions, restructuring. There even is one case of the noun 
used in a different sense: 
 
can be reached from a study of his materials beyond the 
 
However, such a shift is rather an exception to the rule. Mostly, authors do 
not use a word in homophonic realisations. 
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Repetitions of problem 
A different type of repetition is exemplified by the lexeme problem. As 
can be seen from the identifying phrases below, two different concepts are 
picked up:  
 
problem of acquisition of knowledge 
proposal to deal with the problem of acquisition of knowledge of 
i have been describing the problem of acquisition of knowledge of 
the exact nature of the problem of acquisition of knowledge 
 
would then face the problem of explaining how the pre-linguistic 
ite senseless to raise the problem of explaining the evolution of 
ted that there exists a problem of explaining 
 
Several cases of phrases where problem appears as a substitute are found 
in the text. As can be seen from the examples below, a different problem is 
named each time:  
 
 speculation, however, has no bearing one way or another on those 
aspects of the problem of mind that can be sensibly pursued. It seems to me that 
these aspects  
 structure of the visual cortex. No one who has given any serious thought 
to the problem of formalising inductive procedures or "heuristic methods" is likely 
to  
  d as the actual theory of the language in question. I have been 
describing the problem of acquisition of knowledge of language in terms that are 
more familiar  
   is possible. Peirce, to my knowledge, is original and unique in stressing 
the problem of studying the rules that limit the class of possible theories. Of cour 
  I doubt that it has been fully appreciated to what extent this complicates 
the problem of accounting for language acquisition. Formally speaking, the 
learner m 
  or suggests a plausible alternative approach, with empirical content, to 
the problem of acquisition of knowledge. Assuming the rough accuracy of 
conclusions  
   model for investigation of other cultural and social systems. In general, 
the problem of extending concepts of linguistic structure to other cognitive systems 
 estrictive. The third sub-task, then, is to study what we might think of as 
the problem of "confirmation" — in this context, the problem of what relation must  
  what we might think of as the problem of "confirmation" — in this 
context, the problem of what relation must hold between a potential grammar and 
a set of data 
 the problem of learning, but will rather offer an incorrect solution to this 
problem. The issue is an empirical one of truth or falsity, not a methodological 
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 empirical assumption. As I have argued earlier, a non-dogmatic 
approach to this problem can be pursued, without reliance on unargued 
assumptions of this sort —  
  earning is how this invention of grammar can take place. Putnam does 
face this problem and suggests that there might be "general multipurpose learning 
strategi 
 age in these domains. No one, to my knowledge, has devoted more 
thought to this problem than Lévi-Strauss. For example, his recent book on the 
categories of pri 
 
This type of noun is characterised by the flexibility of its conceptual load. 
What is actually included with each repetition depends on the immediate 
context, rather than on some general scope particular to the lexical item. 
Repetitions of system and systems 
Finally, we take a look at two forms of a lexeme which occur with equal 
frequency – system and systems. The latter names two types of objects: 
symbolic systems and communication systems, while the former applies to 
both and a few other referents in phrases of the type we called substitute. 
 
The plural noun appears in concordances like these: 
 
 that there exists a problem of explaining the "evolution" of human 
language from systems of animal communication. However, a careful look at 
recent studies of an 
 There have been some attempts to study the structure of other, language-like 
systems — the study of kinship systems and folk taxonomies comes to mind, for ex 
  what human language is, we find no striking similarity to animal 
communication systems. There is nothing useful to be said about behaviour or 
thought at the le 
  assumption that there is an evolutionary development of language from 
simpler systems of the sort that one discovers in other organisms. Popper argues 
that th 
   for a moment. The assumption that human language evolved from more 
primitive systems is developed in an interesting way by Karl Popper in his recently 
published 
 of the universal features in a fundamental way, but it is the properties of 
the systems of rules, it seems to me, that really shed light on the specific nature 
  Lévi-Strauss occasionally alludes, becomes meaningful only when one 
considers systems of rules with infinite generative capacity. There is nothing to be 
said 
  were present in some form in these already acquired prelinguistic 
"symbolic systems." But since there is not the slightest reason to believe that this is  
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 evidence that the mind is simpler in its innate structure than other 
biological systems, just as it would be mere dogmatism to insist that the mind's 
organisation 
 
The uses are mainly generic. The attributes are in the semantic range of 
communication systems to systems of language rules. 
 
The singular noun can be found in concordances exemplified below: 
 
Citation form: 
man's case, the argument is based entirely on a vague use of the term "symbolic 
system," and it collapses as soon as we attempt to give this term a precise mean 
 
Identifying forms – different referents: 
those of Lord Herbert and Descartes, both of whom took for granted that the 
system of innate ideas and principles would not function unless appropriate 
stimulus 
e at the moment about the general properties of the underlying phrase structure 
system for natural languages; the dispute is not in the least resolved by the ex 
  that the a priori is due to hereditary differentiations of the central 
nervous system which have become characteristic of the species, producing 
hereditary dis 
 properties of the physical world is based on innate organisation of the neural 
system. In some cases at least, these built-in structures will degenerate unles  
 
Definite generic forms 
  "simplest possible" one would have to demonstrate that the "optimal" 
computing system would take a string of symbols as input and determine its 
surface structure 
 
Indefinite Generic forms: 
conclusions involves a false assumption. From the fact that a phrase structure 
system contains proper names one can conclude almost nothing about its other cat 
 
Identifying indefinite uses: 
that "acquisition of an initial language is acquisition of a secondary symbolic 
system" and is quite on a par with normal second-language acquisition. The prima 
systems provide the "algorithms which are 'simplest' for virtually any computing 
system," hence also "for naturally evolved 'computing systems' "; and that there 
invariant through long historical eras. Furthermore, we discover a substantial 
system of principles that do not vary among languages that are, as far as we know 
ws," nevertheless held firmly that underlying any human language we will find a 
system that is universal, that simply expresses man's unique intellectual attrib 
  seem tenable today, it is reasonable to suppose that a generative 
grammar is a system of many hundreds of rules of several different types, 
organised in accord 
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tence — knowledge of a language — as an abstract system underlying behaviour, 
a system constituted by rules that interact to determine the form and intrinsic me 
 we must regard linguistic competence — knowledge of a language — as 
an abstract system underlying behaviour, a system constituted by rules that 
interact to determine 
 
Substitutes: 
 ures or "heuristic methods" is likely to set much store by the hope that 
such a system as a generative grammar can be constructed by methods of any 
generality.  
 ation, is common to all languages. There is no a priori "naturalness" to 
such a system, any more than there is to the detailed structure of the visual cortex. 
N 
 
As can be seen, the singular phrases differ both in their referents, that is, 
name different concepts, and in the type of referentiality. Some uses are 
generic, others–specific and all of them are included in different 
propositional actions: generalising, giving examples, referring back to 
previous uses, picking up iterative referents etc. The discussion revolves 
around the issue of searching for and interpreting systems for 
communicating ideas. Unlike the repetitions of language, these ones 
present an evolving argument. On most occasions the repeated noun forms 
part of naming complexes with other lexemes, where the meaning is the 
result of pulling together intensions from the component parts.  
Conclusion: patterns 
Therefore, four types of repeated items are established: 
 
1. Repetitions outlining the conceptual field of investigation. They 
maintain reference to selected concepts under discussion in the article. The 
term that can name this type is conceptual/analytical chain. An example 
is the chain of repetitions of language. The repetitions in this group occur 
with changes in the intension, which allows the author to broaden the 
scope of the discussion.  
2. Repetitions describing the analytical framework within which answers 
are sought to the research question. We can adopt the term illustrative 
chain. This type is exemplified by the repetitions of the forms system and 
systems. These chains are immediately visible in the frequency list of 
repetitions, because they include both the plural and the singular form in 
roughly equal numbers. The referential types differ, which allows the 
author to include them in developing his argument through a range of 
propositional functions. 
